How Russia Was Winning World War I — But Lost to Revolution

When it comes to World War I, public memory is foggy at best. At worst, it blindly echoes old Bolshevik propaganda: that it was an “imperialist bloodbath” into which “Tsarist Russia was senselessly dragged.” The war is largely erased from collective memory — and yet it was in this conflict that Russia demonstrated military might, strategic resilience, and sacrifice on a scale rivaled only by the Great Patriotic War (World War II).

More importantly, Russia didn’t lose on the battlefield — it was brought down from within by unrest and revolution.

A War Russia Didn’t Want

World War I did not begin because of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. That was merely the spark. At its core, the war was a clash between competing global models. On one side stood the rapidly expanding Anglo-American capitalism—built on colonies, finance, and control of maritime trade. Britain and the United States sought to preserve (or inherit) global dominance—less through military might than through financial and logistical supremacy. Their ideal world was a unified market governed by banks, debt instruments, trade agreements, and technical standards. And for that system to function, any powers outside it had to be neutralized.

Opposing them was Germany—a rising industrial and technological rival to Britain by the 1910s. This was a disciplined, technocratic state seeking its own expansion into Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Germany needed markets, resources, and ports, but unlike Britain, it offered a hard, vertical alternative. German banks and industrial cartels wanted to dictate terms as well. Their slogan may have differed, but the goal was the same: domination.

Then there was Russia—a traditional Eurasian imperial model, where the state still stood above bankers, and where the economy didn’t directly dictate foreign policy. Russia posed a problem for both sides: sovereign, vast, ideologically distinct, and rich in resources untouched by Western financial control.

Yet despite modern conspiracy clichés, Russia did not seek this war. It actively tried to avoid it. Tsar Nicholas II was the first European monarch to publicly call for the creation of an international body to prevent wars—a prototype of the League of Nations, proposed at the turn of the 20th century [1]. And in July 1914, when Austria-Hungary launched its aggression against Serbia, it was Nicholas who proposed international arbitration. Germany responded with one answer: an ultimatum — Serbia must lose its sovereignty, or there would be war.

By 1914, Germany faced growing strategic anxiety. Russia was rapidly modernizing its army, building new railways, and would become nearly unbeatable in 2–3 years. The German General Staff made a cold calculation: strike now while there’s still an advantage, and defeat France and Russia separately [2].

Refusing to support its allies would have meant Russia turning its back on a world where smaller Slavic nations could be overrun with impunity. It stepped in to protect Serbia, an Orthodox and Slavic ally, facing Austro-Hungarian aggression. This was not merely a matter of treaties, but a historical and moral responsibility, rooted in Russia’s long-standing role as the defender of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. Ultimately, it was Germany — not Russia — that declared war first, on August 1, 1914.

Russia: The Pillar Without Which the Entente Would Have Collapsed

Throughout the war, Russia remained the main shield of Europe, holding back the blows of the Central Powers. From the earliest days of the conflict, the Russian army shouldered an enormous burden. While the British and French were still frantically mobilizing, Russia was already fighting—on two, sometimes even three fronts: from the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus Mountains.

The length of the Russian front reached 1,934 kilometers—nearly three times that of the Western Front (630 km) [3]. Russia fought simultaneously against three empires: Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. And the Russian army faced the best, elite divisions of the enemy. By 1917, up to 150 enemy divisions were concentrated on the Eastern Front—more than on the Western Front [4].

It was Russia that saved its allies at the most critical moments. In August 1914, at the very beginning of the war, the Russian army launched the East Prussian operation. Despite the tragic loss of General Samsonov’s army, the operation achieved its strategic goal: the German high command was forced to divert troops from the Western Front, disrupting its advance on Paris [5]. Russia saved France again in September by launching an offensive in Galicia and capturing Lviv. Meanwhile, near Warsaw and Łódź, Russian forces repelled massive German attacks, preventing any advance into Poland.

In 1915, despite severe losses and a major retreat, Russia prevented the destruction of Serbia and Romania. In early 1916, Russian forces struck in the Caucasus, crushing the Ottoman Empire’s main forces, liberating Erzurum and Trabzon, and cutting German arms supplies via southern routes. But the highest point of the war came with the Brusilov Offensive.

The Great Victory of General Brusilov

The summer 1916 offensive of the Southwestern Front, led by General Aleksei Brusilov, marked a triumph of Russian military strategy. It was the first large-scale offensive conducted across a broad front, emphasizing surprise, secrecy, and concentrated artillery fire. Russian forces didn’t just break the line—they shattered the backbone of the Austro-Hungarian army. In the first few days alone, over 200,000 enemy soldiers and officers were captured, along with vast amounts of artillery and ammunition [6].

Austria was on the brink of military collapse. Germany had to urgently redeploy around 30 divisions from France and Italy to the Eastern Front to save its ally, thereby weakening its position in the West. This shift allowed the Allies to launch the Somme Offensive. In effect, the Russian army made it possible for the British and French to organize the year’s largest battle. And just a few months prior, those same allies had asked Russia to only make diversionary gestures, doubting its offensive potential. Once again, Russia delivered the impossible.

Brusilov’s front became a model of high-level tactical planning and discipline. The operation was prepared with exceptional thoroughness: officers studied terrain, prepared positions, and trained the troops. Brusilov opposed military clichés—rather than concentrating forces in one “shock fist,” he launched attacks on multiple sectors, preventing the enemy from predicting where the main blow would land. This strategy was ahead of its time and later inspired the German generals in 1940 under a different name—blitzkrieg.

The Brusilov Offensive not only saved Italy—then suffering heavy losses to Austria-Hungary—but also prompted Romania to join the Entente. The war escalated to a new level, and it was the Russian army that became its primary catalyst. After the operation, Brusilov wrote: “The soldiers showed incredible endurance. They advanced with faith that Russia stood behind them.”

The Damage Inflicted on the Enemy Was Colossal

The numbers speak for themselves. According to data compiled by historian Aleksei Oleynikov, by the end of 1917:

• The Russian army captured up to 60% of all Central Powers POWs taken by the Allies;

• Nearly 72% of all artillery trophies taken by the Entente were captured by the Russians;

• Total enemy losses on the Eastern Front exceeded half of all their losses in the war [7].

And these were the result of offensives often carried out without the necessary support from allies. Russia achieved this despite having a much weaker industrial base, overextended logistics, and a constant shortage of arms, while simultaneously modernizing its military structure on the move.

By 1917, Russia had indeed reached a peak of military strain—but not the verge of collapse, as defeatist narratives often claim. On the contrary—it had achieved a strategic turning point. After the Brusilov Offensive, Germany had to divert up to 30 divisions from the West to the East. According to the General Staff, Russia still had over 200 combat-ready divisions, and shell production in 1916 had increased twentyfold compared to 1915 [8]. Even German General Ludendorff acknowledged in his memoirs:

“The Russian front holds our main forces. Their 1916 offensive brought us to the brink of defeat.” [9]

Had it not been for the internal betrayal, Russia had every chance of ending the war among the victorious powers. This was echoed by Russian émigré generals:

“Russia had already entered the phase of decisive superiority…”
— General Nikolai Golovin [10]

He emphasized that the outcome of the war was not determined on the battlefield, but by the coup at home.

If Not for Russia...
Had it not been for the Russian army, Germany would have broken through to the English Channel long before the Allies could organize. Britain and France would not have had time to mobilize, let alone establish stable defensive positions. It was Russia, at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives, that bought the Allies their most critical resource: time. And this time was used to build industrial superiority, complete mobilization, and develop military technology. But it was Russia who earned it. And when victory was near, internal unrest wiped it all away [11].

The Erzurum Operation: Crushing the Sultan’s Empire

While Europe was bogged down in trench warfare, the Russian army struck a devastating blow on the southern flank, in the mountains of eastern Anatolia. The Caucasian army under General Nikolai Yudenich launched a bold, meticulously planned winter offensive in early 1916 against the heavily fortified Ottoman stronghold of Erzurum.

Erzurum was considered impregnable — a mountain bastion of trenches, barbed wire, mines, and artillery. Western armies would have spent months cracking it. Yudenich took it in just two weeks:

• The operation began in January, in deep winter, with temperatures below –30°C.

• Russian troops maneuvered over snow-covered passes, flanking the defenses.

• Deceptive maneuvers, night raids, and precision attacks allowed them to overrun the fortress by February 16.

• Russians captured 250 cannons, thousands of prisoners, and then marched to Trebizond on the Black Sea, taking it in April.

The Ottoman army in the Caucasus collapsed. Germany lost its southern partner in the region. It was a strategic disaster for the Ottomans, and a demonstration of Russia’s operational brilliance [12].

Russia Entered as an Ally, Not an Aggressor

Russia did not enter the war in pursuit of conquest or colonial gain. It acted in accordance with its alliance commitments to Serbia and France, established by the 1892 military convention. This was not a symbolic arrangement — France depended on Russia as its eastern shield. Nicholas II upheld that commitment fully, aware of the risks it entailed.

When Austria-Hungary issued its deliberately unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia and Germany backed it, Nicholas II became the only leader to propose international arbitration. He pleaded with the Kaiser to stop mobilization — telegrams known today as the "Willy-Nicky" correspondence — a tragic testament to his desire to prevent war. He knew: if Russia stepped back, France would fall, and Germany would overrun Europe [13].

It was Germany that declared war on Russia — just as it did in World War II. This single fact dismantles the myth of “Russian imperialism.” Russia had no colonial ambitions in Europe, no oil interests in Mesopotamia like Britain. It entered the war to defend its allies and to try, while it still could, to prevent the catastrophe it saw coming [14].

And this wasn’t the first time Russia had appealed to peace. Long before Wilson's Fourteen Points, it was Nicholas IIwho proposed the creation of a permanent international body to resolve global conflicts. He initiated the Hague Conference of 1899, which brought disarmament, international law, and peaceful dispute resolution to the table. His 1898 memorandum became, in many ways, the philosophical predecessor to Wilson’s League of Nations — only without the American double standards [15].

Internal Sabotage and Revolution — That’s Why Russia “Lost” the War

To claim that Russia "lost" World War I is to falsify chronology. By the end of 1916, Russia was not losing — it was winning. The Brusilov Offensive was not only the Entente’s greatest military success, it shattered Austria-Hungary and forced it under full German command. Simultaneously, Yudenich’s Caucasian army dealt a crushing blow to the Ottomans, capturing Erzurum and Trebizond.

By late 1916, Russia held the longest front line in the war, controlled vast territories, and maintained the second-largest and still battle-capable army in Europe, despite mounting supply problems. The enemy was exhausted. Germany was no longer calculating peace terms. Russia, on the other hand, was preparing for victory. In early 1917, parade uniforms were already being tailored for the final push. Ironically, those same uniforms greatcoats, officer caps would soon be worn by the revolutionaries. The military dress of the Empire became the garb of its gravediggers [16].

Order No. 1 — A Knife in the Army’s Back

So why did Russia collapse? The answer lies not at the front, but in the rear. The enemy was not only on the outside — but already embedded inside. After the February Revolution, the Provisional Government rapidly lost control of the armed forces. On March 1, 1917, in the middle of the war, the Petrograd Soviet issued a document that many historians now view as one of the most destructive in Russian military history: Order No. 1. Russia had not yet suffered a decisive defeat — but this order ensured one would come.

What did it do?

• Allowed soldiers to form committees and ignore orders not approved by them

• Banned epaulets, removing visual signs of rank

• Made commander selection collective and “democratic” — as if war were a union meeting

• Though officially limited to Petrograd, it spread across the entire army in practice

The order stated: "In all companies, battalions, squadrons, and batteries, immediately elect company, battalion, and other committees."

An Army Without Officers Is Not an Army. Before Order No. 1, morale was strained, but command structure remained. After:

• Officers were removed, sometimes killed

• Orders were disobeyed unless “debated” — a death sentence in war

• Troops deserted positions, retreating with weapons

• Conflicts broke out between troops and officers, including assassinations

• Bolsheviks, backed from abroad, agitated openly for defeat and civil war

The command collapsed. The front crumbled not due to enemy pressure but internal rot. As Oleynikov notes: "Russia’s defeat in the war was not due to losses at the front, but due to the deliberate dismantling of the political and military management system.” [17]

The Brest-Litovsk Treaty — Shame, Not Necessity

After February came October. The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin who arrived from Germany in a sealed train, paid for by the German General Staff [18] seized power.
Shortly after, Lenin signed a peace treaty with the enemy — Germany.

When the Bolsheviks took power in October 1917, they inherited an army still capable of fighting, and an enemy at the breaking point. Germany was starving, out of reserves, and collapsing on all fronts.
But the Bolsheviks intentionally dismantled everything:

• They withdrew troops

• Canceled mobilization

• Negotiated the Brest-Litovsk Treaty — a humiliating, separate peace

Under the treaty, Russia ceded its most developed territories:

• Ukraine

• Belarus

• The Baltics

• Part of the Caucasus

• And paid reparations

Even Lenin himself admitted it openly: the February Revolution and the collapse of the army served the purpose of turning the imperialist war into a civil war — a war for power, not national defense. [19].

Debunking the Myths

Myth #1: “Russia was losing the war”

This is the most persistent and misleading myth, repeated by Western textbooks, leftist journalists, and even some Russian historians. But it contradicts hard facts, documents, and chronology. But from 1915 to 1917, Germany repeatedly transferred divisions from the Western Front to the Eastern Front — not the other way around. This alone disproves the notion of a “weak” Russian army.

Numbers they don’t teach in school:

• In 1917, up to 150 divisions of the Central Powers were deployed against Russia — including elite German and Austro-Hungarian forces.

• On the French front at the same time — 142 divisions.

• By 1916, 40% of all German forces were fighting Russia, not France — saving Verdun from collapse.

It was Russia that seized strategic initiative in 1916 with the Brusilov Offensive, forcing Germany and Austria-Hungary into full defense mode.

Myth #2: “Russia suffered enormous losses”
Another cliché claims Russia “threw millions of men into the meat grinder.” But what do the numbers say?

Total casualties (killed, wounded):

• Russia: ~5.3 million (1.3–1.5 million combat deaths), or ~7.6 million including POWs

• France: ~5.5 million (1.3–1.4 million combat deaths), or ~6.1 million with POWs

• Germany: 6.25+ million (2 million combat deaths), or ~7.4 million with POWs

• Austria-Hungary: 4.72 million (1.1–1.2 million combat deaths), or ~6.9 million with POWs

Russia did suffer more prisoners of war, particularly after the 1915 retreat. But in actual combat losses, Russia lost less than Germany and Austria-Hungary while had the highest number of mobilized troops by far. Combat losses for Russia amounted to approximately 1.3–1.5 million, meaning that the percentage of soldiers killed out of the total mobilized (~15.5 mobilized) was lower than, for example, in Germany, which mobilized around 13.2 million and lost about 2 million in combat.

It’s ironic, but to inflate Russia’s death toll, Western sources often include those who died from the Spanish flu—even after the war had ended. Yet the flu struck every country, not just Russia. The fact that people in Russia died amid the collapse triggered by war, revolution, and growing internal chaos is just another inconvenient truth they tend to overlook.

Russia inflicted the most damage on the enemy. Up to 60% of all POWs taken from Germany and Austria-Hungary, and 72% of all captured artillery credited to the Entente came from Russian efforts [20].

Myth #3: “An imperialist slaughter”
This narrative was invented by Bolshevik propaganda in 1917 to justify their surrender and power grab under the slogan “peace at any cost.” But it has no basis in reality.

As previously noted, Tsar Nicholas II had no ambitions of territorial conquest. His foreign policy was guided by a desire to preserve peace and stabilize Europe. He even offered to act as a mediator in the conflict. Russia primary aim was to protect Orthodox Slavs in the Balkans from German-Austrian and Ottoman aggression. Unlike the other great powers, Russia had no ambitions in Africa or designs on Belgian ports.

So who was truly fighting for imperialism?

• France wanted to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine and secure dominance over the Rhineland. Despite its narrative of national defense, fought to protect and expand its colonial empire, regain lost territory, and exert dominance in Europe and the Middle East.

• Britain sought to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, secure control over Mesopotamia (for oil), and strengthen its grip on Persia and the Suez route to India.

• Germany pursued economic and political hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe through its Mitteleuropa plan.

• Austria-Hungary aimed to crush Serbian nationalism and dominate the Balkans.

As for Russia, it posed a civilizational alternative to Western domination — and for that reason, it was marked for destruction.

Myth #4: “Russia was exhausted by war”
This is the core of the liberal-Western legend that the Revolution was inevitable — that the country was on its last legs by 1917. In fact, the opposite is true.

Economy: growth, not collapse

• By 1916, military production was 4–5x higher than in 1914.

• Ammunition output increased 20-fold, rifles by 7x.

• Russia launched 40 new defense plants in Petrograd, Moscow, Samara, Tula, even Siberia.

• Import substitution had begun: domestic production of explosives, optics, railcars, even automobiles.

• Railroads were overloaded but functional. The real crisis in transport began in late 1916 due to sabotage, not resource exhaustion [21].

Food: it existed — but didn’t reach cities

• The 1916 harvest was average. There was no national famine.

• The crisis was one of logistics, caused by strikes and railroad sabotage, often stirred up by Socialist agitators.

• The army had no shortages. The food crisis was urban, especially in Petrograd and Moscow and, evidence shows, it was engineered [22].

Military: modernized and strong

• By 1916, the Russian army had 8.5 million men under arms.

• New Mosin rifles, updated machine guns, heavy artillery.

• Shock battalions and trench warfare tactics.

• Two major victories: the Brusilov Offensive and the Erzurum campaign.

So where was the “collapse”? It was deliberate. Between 1916–1917:

• Liberals and parts of the Duma sabotaged logistics.

• Socialist agitators incited unrest in factories and garrisons.

• Order No. 1 destroyed army discipline.

• Strikes were orchestrated in rail and food sectors.

The breakdown of supply and order came top-down, from the elite — not from the masses.

Myth #5: “Nicholas II was a weak and incompetent commander who gave poor military orders.”

Nicholas II as Supreme Commander-in-Chief from 1915 to 1917, he made rational, coordinated, and often effective decisions that stabilized the front and boosted morale.

• In August 1915, after setbacks on the Galician Front, Nicholas dismissed Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and took personal command of the army, a move many feared but that ultimately brought order and focus to the command structure.

• He maintained close cooperation with the General Staff, avoided micromanagement, and supported innovative strategies, including the Brusilov Offensive.

• Under his leadership, logistics and munitions supply improved, and the front was stabilized despite enormous pressures.

• His presence at Headquarters (Stavka) was described by generals as calm, disciplined, and deeply responsible. General Brusilov later noted that Nicholas showed “restraint, dignity, and a clear sense of duty.”

Nicholas II was not incompetent; on the contrary, he was a cautious and responsible statesman who refrained from interfering in tactics, instead providing strategic consistency. The collapse of the army did not result from his decisions, but from Order No. 1 — issued after the revolution by those who had no plan for war, only a plan for power.

Why does the West push these myths?

Because to accept the truth would mean admitting:

• Russia wasn’t losing the war — it was betrayed.

• The economy wasn’t collapsing — it was being sabotaged.

• The Tsar’s army wasn’t incompetent — it was effective.

• Nicholas II didn’t blunder — he was strategic.

• The October coup wasn’t liberation — it was the downfall of a civilization that was about to win.

Had Russia preserved its command system and finished the war, it would’ve entered Versailles as a victor, shaping the postwar world. Instead, those who surrendered it for slogans and German gold took power.

The War Russia Was Winning — and the Victory She Was Denied

By 1917, Russia had reached the peak of her military power. She had saved France and Serbia, delivered a crushing blow to the enemy in the Brusilov Offensive — the largest success of the Entente — and held a front stretching nearly 2,000 kilometers. Russia fought with strategic initiative and unmatched resilience.

Yes, there were hardships — economic strain, supply disruptions, and war fatigue. But these were universal. By 1917, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France were also nearing collapse. Yet only in Russia did the army get deliberately dismantled, the chain of command destroyed, and the state system sabotaged from within.

The Empire didn’t fall because of economic failure. It fell to internal subversion — revolutionary agitation, organized sabotage, collapse of discipline, and betrayal by the political elite. Just as victory was within reach, the blow came from behind.

Lenin openly called for turning the “imperialist war” into a civil war. He demoralized the army, dismantled the state, and pulled Russia out of the war at its most decisive moment when even the German General Staff no longer believed in victory. In 1917, Russia stood at the finish line. By 1918, she had been destroyed from within and set back for decades, losing between 8 and 12 million people in the civil war by 1923, compared to 1.3 – 1.5 million in World War I.

“Our country lost the war to the side that was already losing. A unique situation in human history.” — Vladimir Putin

Indeed. Russia became the only power to win on the battlefield but lose through betrayal in the rear. And after canceling the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin didn’t even demand compensation from the Allies despite Russia’s enormous contribution to their victory.

Russia’s downfall was the result of internal sabotage. Her achievements were erased, her commanders discredited, and her role in the First World War deliberately distorted. It’s time to state the truth clearly: Russia stood at the gates of victory and was stabbed in the back.

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Sources:

[1] Kazakov A.V. Russia’s Role in the First World War and the Formation of the Post-War World Order, 2022. Dissertation, pp. 14–15 (on Tsar Nicholas II’s peace proposals before WWI).

[2] Ibid., pp. 29–31 (on German calculations and military planning for a preventive war).

[3] Golovin, N. N. The Russian Army in World War I

[4] Fuller, J. F. C. Decisive Battles of the Western World

[5] Stone, N. The Eastern Front 1914–1917

[6] Brusilov, A. A. My Memoirs

[7] Oleynikov, A. V. Dissertation on the Eastern Front, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2021

[8] Wildman, A. The End of the Russian Imperial Army

[9] Ludendorff, E. My War Memories 1914–1918

[10] Golovin, N. N., quoted in Novaya Rossiya (Paris, 1924)

[11] Alexey Oleynikov, Military Potential of the Russian Empire on the Eve of 1917, Moscow Defense University, 2019.

[12] General N.N. Golovin, The Eastern Front in World War I: Military Operations of 1914–1917, émigré publication, Paris, 1930.

[13] The Willy–Nicky Telegrams, Imperial War Museum Archives, UK.

[14] Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War, Harvard University Press, 2011.

[15] Hague Peace Conference Archives, 1899; Nicholas II's 1898 Memorandum on Disarmament.

[16] Alexey Oleynikov, Military Potential of the Russian Empire on the Eve of 1917, Moscow Defense University, 2019.

[17] Ibid., Chapter: “Collapse of Military Hierarchy and Internal Sabotage”

[18] Zeman, Z.A.B. & Scharlau, W.B. “The Merchant of Revolution: The Life of Alexander Israel Helphand (Parvus)”, 98–100.

[19] Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (primary documents), cited in: Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, Knopf, 1990; Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War, Harvard University Press, 2011.

[20] Alexey Oleynikov, Military Losses of the Russian Empire in World War I, Defense University Press, 2019.

[21] Ibid., Chapter: “Industrial Production and Transport Sabotage, 1916–17”

[22] Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War, Harvard University Press, 2011; Richard Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, 1994.